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Articles 
Wading into the Daubert Tide:  
Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of 
Southern California 
 
David L. Faigman*  and Edward J. Imwinkelried** 
 
In Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, the California Supreme 
Court decided arguably the most important expert testimony decision that it has rendered 
in at least two decades. Prior to Sargon, California appeared steadfastly committed to the 
classic “general acceptance” test, which required judges to assess whether an expert’s 
theory or technique had gained general acceptance in the relevant fields. In 1993, in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the United States Supreme Court 
announced a new empirical validation test. In the years since 1993, most state courts 
adopted some version of Daubert, but until Sargon the California Supreme Court had 
refused to follow the federal lead.  
 
Sargon undoubtedly moves California jurisprudence toward the Daubert approach. In 
Sargon, the court adopted the fundamental perspective of Daubert and embraced key 
terminology from the Daubert opinion and its progeny. These parallels have prompted 
some commentators to declare that California is now in the Daubert camp. 
 
Although Sargon is a step toward the Daubert approach, it is premature to conclude that 
Sargon goes that far for at least two reasons. First, even post-Sargon, the California 
approach may be laxer than the federal approach. In Daubert, Justice Blackmun stated 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) governs the trial judge’s admissibility decision, 
which mandates that the judge probe deeply into the bases for the expert’s opinion, even 
including assessing credibility. Sargon stops short of explicitly going that far. Second, the 
California approach may prove to be more demanding than the federal approach. In a 
footnote, Sargon indicates that the Frye test is still good law in California. If so, then some 
proponents may face the daunting task of surmounting both hurdles to admissibility.  
 
 * John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of 
the Law; Professor of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine; Director, 
University of California, San Francisco/University of California, Hastings Consortium on Law, Science, 
and Health Policy. 
 ** Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. 
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Introduction 
Since the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993,1 state courts and 
legislatures have confronted the persistent question of whether they 
should adopt the evidentiary test established by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Like a slowly rising tide, the Daubert test has washed over most 
state expert evidence rules. Today, the majority of states employ Daubert 
entirely and explicitly,2 while many others do so implicitly or partially.3 
Still, several states have held out, steadfastly maintaining their 
independence from the federal regime—though most of these states model 
their rules on another federal case, Daubert’s predecessor Frye v. United 
States.4 California has been perhaps the highest profile holdout, due to a 
 
 1.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2.  See, e.g., Ala. R. Evid. § 702 (2012) (adopting a rule “identical to the corresponding Federal 
Rule of Evidence”); see also David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and 
Science of Expert Testimony 20 n.8 (2012) (collecting cases). 
 3.  See, e.g., Marron v. Stromstad, 123 P.3d 992, 1004 (Alaska 2005) (“But we have never 
adopted Kumho Tire’s extension of Daubert to all expert testimony . . . . [W]e limit our application of 
Daubert to expert testimony based on scientific theory, as opposed to testimony based upon the 
expert’s personal experience.”); see also David Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos 
Litigation, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 11, 22 (2003); 1 Paul C. Giannelli et al, Scientific Evidence §§ 1.14–15 
(5th ed. 2012) (collecting cases); Faigman et al., supra note 2, at 20 n.8. 
 4. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  
Faigman_64-HLJ-1665 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:32 PM 
August 2013]       WADING INTO THE DAUBERT TIDE 1667 
substantial jurisprudence built around its 1976 People v. Kelly decision, 
which adopted Frye’s general acceptance test as the governing standard 
in California.5 However, in Sargon Enterprises v. University of Southern 
California,6 the California Supreme Court dipped its feet into the Daubert 
tide. Although Sargon does not fully incorporate Daubert into California’s 
Evidence Code, Sargon signals the court’s interest in testing those waters. 
California’s history with expert evidence is checkered to say the least. 
Many view California as having adopted a liberal standard for determining 
the admissibility of such testimony.7 This perceived liberality could explain 
the extensive use of expert testimony at trial in California.8 Yet, the 
California Supreme Court adopted the Frye test limiting scientific 
testimony to evidence based on theories and techniques generally accepted 
in the relevant scientific communities; in doing so, the court asserted that it 
was deliberately choosing a conservative admissibility test to compensate 
for lay jurors’ supposed tendency to attach undue weight to scientific 
testimony. In the ensuing years, however, the court sharply limited the 
Kelly test’s scope. In 1984, for example, the court refused to apply the test 
to psychological testimony about the supposed unreliability of eyewitness 
identifications.9 In doing so, the court commented that the Kelly test 
should be restricted to “evidence . . . produced by a machine.”10 The court 
reasoned that the Frye test (also called the Kelly-Frye test) is based on 
the fear that scientific testimony will overawe the trier of fact, but only 
testimony based on instrumental techniques creates this danger to an 
acute degree.11 California courts thus apply a conservative Frye-style test 
to technologies such as polygraphs, DNA profiling, and blood alcohol 
tests, but not to expertise based on the experience of the expert. In fact, 
California courts “have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert medical 
testimony.”12 In 1989, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its view 
that non-instrumental expert testimony is exempt from California’s version 
of the general acceptance test.13 The end result has been that in California 
civil cases, litigants have been able to present expert medical causation 
opinions with “relative ease.”14 
 
 5. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976). 
 6. 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012). 
 7. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, High Court Changes Evidentiary Standards, Recorder, Dec. 6, 2012, 
at 11. 
 8. California litigators make extensive use of expert testimony at trial. In one study funded by the 
Rand Corporation, researchers reviewed 529 California trials. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 
Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1119 (1991). The researchers found that experts appeared at eighty-six percent of the 
trials. Id. On average, there were 3.3 experts per trial; at trials with experts, the average was 3.8. Id. 
 9. People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1984). 
 10. Id. at 723–24. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 724. 
 13. People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989). 
 14. Barnes, supra note 7, at 1. 
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Therefore, from 1976 (when Kelly was decided) to Sargon in 2012, 
California courts have followed a somewhat divided path. On one side, 
when expert testimony involves a scientific test or mechanism, California 
courts have applied a rigorously conservative general acceptance standard, 
ostensibly to protect jurors from being overawed by a misleading aura of 
scientific certainty. In contrast, when the expert testimony was not based 
on the results of scientific tests or rested principally on the experience or 
inferential judgment of the expert, California courts have used a relaxed 
standard and have largely allowed experts to testify if they were qualified 
and their opinions were relevant to the facts in dispute. 
Meanwhile, the evidentiary jurisprudence surrounding expert 
testimony took an altogether different road in the federal courts. In its 
1993 Daubert decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled, in an 
opinion by Justice Blackmun, that Frye was no longer good law in federal 
practice, despite the fact that it had previously been followed by most 
federal courts.15 The Court derived a new admissibility test from the 
reference to “scientific . . . knowledge” in the text of Federal Rule 702.16 
Justice Blackmun first asserted that the statutory reference to “knowledge” 
“connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”17 He 
then adopted an essentially methodological definition of “science”: 
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods 
and procedures of science. . . . [I]n order to qualify as “scientific 
knowledge,” an inference or assertion must be derived by the 
scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation . . . . In short, the requirement that an 
expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes 
a standard of evidentiary reliability.18 
In relatively short order, the Court rendered two more decisions 
under this line of authority. In 1997, the Court decided General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner.19 The principal issue presented by Joiner was the proper 
standard of appellate review of trial court admissibility decisions. The 
Court followed standard evidentiary practice in adopting the abuse of 
discretion standard for such decisions.20 Importantly, the Joiner Court 
also discussed the methodological standard it had set forth in Daubert, 
 
 15. The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975. Justice Blackmun stated that he could 
not find any statutory language codifying the traditional general acceptance test. Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1993). Consequently, the enactment of the Federal Rules 
had impliedly superseded the Frye test. See, e.g., David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at 
the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the 
Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1799, 1808 (1994) (describing the evolving use of 
Frye in federal courts prior to Daubert). 
 16. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–90. 
 17. Id. at 590. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 20. Id. 
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emphasizing the need for scientific rigor.21 In response to claims that 
Daubert applied only to the methods and principles, and not conclusions, 
of a proffered expert’s testimony, the Court asserted: 
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence 
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is 
connected to the existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.22 
Two years after Joiner, the Court decided the third case of what is 
now known as the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.23 The 
Kumho Tire Court ruled that the requirement for a showing of reliability 
applies to all types of expert testimony, not only to claimed scientific 
expertise.24 The Court acknowledged that Rule 702 refers in the alternative 
to “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” but pointed out 
that all three adjectives modify “knowledge,” a “word . . . that ‘establishes 
a standard of evidentiary reliability.’”25 The Court was insistent that “an 
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, [must] employ[] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual 
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”26 By 
the end of that decade, in 2000, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
Daubert and its progeny had established that to be admissible, any expert 
testimony must satisfy “exacting standards of reliability.”27 
As the contrast between the relatively permissive California 
standards and the rather demanding federal standards became more 
pronounced, the question arose as to whether California would continue 
to adhere to Frye for scientific evidence or abandon Frye and embrace 
Daubert for all expert evidence. In 1994, the year after Daubert, the 
California Supreme Court decided People v. Leahy,28 in which the 
prosecution invited the court to jettison the California approach and adopt 
a Daubert-style validity inquiry. The court declined the invitation.29 In late 
2012, the court faced this issue once again, in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. 
University of Southern California.30 The Sargon court, however, vacillated. 
It paid obeisance to Frye but framed its opinion around Daubert. 
 
 21. Id. at 146. 
 22. Id. at 146. 
 23. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 24. Id. at 141. 
 25. Id. at 147 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993)). 
 26. Id. at 152. 
 27. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). See David L. Faigman, The Daubert 
Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 893, 919 (2013) (describing Weisgram as the fourth case in the Daubert trilogy). 
 28. 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994). 
 29. Id. at 331. 
 30. 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012). 
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The Sargon decision formally reiterated California’s commitment to 
Frye. As in Leahy, the court announced that in California, the general 
acceptance test still controls the admissibility of testimony “regarding 
new scientific techniques.”31 Yet, many passages in Sargon seem to 
undermine the assumption that the Frye test, rather than Daubert, 
governs in California. As discussed in Part I of this Article, the Sargon 
court approvingly cited the three cases in the Daubert line of precedent: 
Daubert itself, as well as both Joiner and Kumho Tire.32 Further, the 
court did not discuss the core cases of Kelly and Leahy beyond a 
perfunctory footnote.33 Even more significantly, Sargon echoed key 
passages in the federal decisions. The parallels between Sargon and the 
Daubert trilogy are so strong that one commentator has declared that 
Sargon aligns “California’s law of expert opinion admissibility with post-
Daubert federal law.”34 In the words of that commentator, Sargon effects 
“a sea-change,” casting the California trial judge in “the same stringent 
gatekeeper role” as a federal district court applying Daubert.35 
The purpose of this Article is not to debate the policy merits of the 
competing Frye and Daubert approaches. Rather, the more limited 
objective of this Article is to assess the extent to which Sargon has 
moved California law toward a Daubert-style reliability inquiry. Has a 
“sea-change” occurred? Is it accurate to categorize California as the 
latest addition to the ranks of Daubert jurisdictions? 
Part I describes the three cases that comprise the Daubert trilogy 
and attempts to identify their essential teachings. Part II shifts to 
discussing California law and Sargon, tracing the history of the Sargon 
litigation and explains the California Supreme Court’s treatment of the 
Daubert trilogy in Sargon. Finally, Part III compares and contrasts 
Sargon and the federal trilogy cases. It demonstrates that although 
Sargon represents a major stride toward Daubert’s validity test, it is yet 
incorrect to characterize California as a Daubert jurisdiction. Careful 
scrutiny of Sargon reveals that though there is much of Daubert in 
Sargon, there remain significant differences between Daubert and the 
analytic framework outlined in Sargon. California courts may one day 
fully embrace Daubert, but it is premature to declare that the day has 
already arrived. Instead, in Sargon the California Supreme Court merely 
stuck its toes into the rising Daubert tide. Only time will tell whether 
California will decide to fully take the plunge. 
 
 31. Id. at 1252 n.6. 
 32. See infra notes 147–157 and accompanying text. 
 33. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 n.6. 
 34. Barnes, supra note 7, at 2. 
 35. Id. at 1. 
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I.  The DAUBERT Trilogy 
In order to determine whether Sargon embraces the federal 
approach to evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony, it is 
necessary to review the leading United States Supreme Court decisions 
in the trilogy.  
A. DAUBERT 
Justice Blackmun concludes part II.A of his majority opinion in 
Daubert by stating that the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
superseded Frye.36 In part II.B, he derived the new validation test from the 
text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.37 The statute refers to “scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge.”38 As the Introduction noted, 
Justice Blackmun began parsing the language by focusing on the word, 
“knowledge.”39 He asserted that Congress’ choice of that term signified 
that the expert’s theory or technique must rest on “more than subjective 
belief or unsupported speculation.”40 Next, Justice Blackmun endeavored 
to interpret the word “scientific.” At this point in his opinion, Justice 
Blackmun drew heavily on the amicus briefs submitted by scientists and 
scientific organizations.41 In large part, those briefs described the modern 
understanding of the scientific process or method. Citing two amicus 
briefs, Justice Blackmun wrote: 
“Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the 
universe. Instead, it represents a process for proposing and 
refining theoretical explanations about the world that are 
subject to further testing and refinement.” But, in order to 
qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or assertion must 
be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must 
be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., “good grounds,” 
based on what is known. In short, the requirement that an 
expert’s testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes 
a standard of evidentiary reliability.42 
Justice Blackmun listed several factors—such as error rates and peer 
review—that the trial judge may consider in evaluating the methodological 
soundness of the research that supposedly validates the technique or 
theory, but underscored that the “inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a 
 
 36. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585–89 (1993). 
 37. Id. at 589–592. 
 38. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975). The same phrase occurs in the 2011 restyled version of Rule 702. 
 39. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (internal citations omitted). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching Implication of the 
Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 55, 60–64 (1995). 
 42. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (quoting Brief for Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Science et al., 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102)). 
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flexible one.” 43 Justice Blackmun stated that in conducting the inquiry, the 
trial judge plays “a gatekeeping role”44 to “screen” out unreliable 
testimony.45 
In part II.B of his opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that the expert’s 
scientific knowledge must “fit” the case.46 He elaborated: “‘Fit’ is not 
always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily 
scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes.”47 Justice Blackmun 
added that “a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry [is] a 
precondition to admissibility.”48 
After sketching the substance of the new validation/reliability 
standard, Justice Blackmun discussed the procedures that federal trial 
judges should follow to apply the standard. He wrote that in order to 
decide the admissibility of proffered scientific testimony, the judge must 
address the foundational question of whether the proponent has 
established that the expert’s underlying technique or theory amounts to 
reliable “scientific knowledge.”49 The Justice specifically stated that the 
preliminary fact-finding procedures codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 
104(a) govern the trial judge’s determination.50 That statement is 
significant: When Rule 104(a) applies to a judge’s determination, the 
judge listens to the foundational testimony proffered by both sides.51 As 
the advisory committee note accompanying Rule 104(a) explains, when 
the judge rules under 104(a), she serves as a true “trier of fact.” The 
judge weighs the evidence pro and con, considers the credibility of the 
testimony,52 and makes a factual determination as to whether the 
foundational fact exists.53 In a footnote, Justice Blackmun indicated that 
the traditional civil standard of “a preponderance of the proof” governs 
the judge’s determination.54 Thus, if the two sides presented conflicting 
testimony about the methodology of a critical experimental test of the 
 
 43. Id. at 594. 
 44. Id. at 597. 
 45. Id. at 589. 
 46. Id. at 591. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 592. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Determining Preliminary Facts Under Federal Rule 104, in 45 Am. 
Jur. Trials §§ 60–62, 64 (Charles S. Parnell ed. 1992) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Preliminary Facts]. 
Under Rule 104(a), the opponent objecting to the admission of evidence has a right to conduct voir 
dire in support of his or her objection. Id. Thus, the opponent has a right to conduct a limited cross-
examination during the direct examination before the judge’s ruling on the objection. Id. 
 52. In Huddleston v. United States, the Court construed Rule 104 and indicated that unlike Rule 
104(a), Rule 104(b) may not “weigh[] credibility.” 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). 
 53. See generally Imwinkelried, Preliminary Facts, supra note 51. 
 54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10. 
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validity of the expert’s theory, the judge would not be obliged to accept 
the proponent’s testimony.55 
B. JOINER 
Like Daubert, Joiner contains important substantive and procedural 
precedent. Substantively, Joiner refines the meaning of the concept of “fit” 
mentioned in Daubert. In Joiner, the plaintiff claimed that his workplace 
exposure to chemical PCB’s had enhanced the onset of his small-cell lung 
cancer.56 In part, the plaintiff’s expert based his causation opinion on 
several animal studies. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist detailed 
some of the studies: 
The studies involved infant mice that had developed cancer after 
being exposed to PCB’s. The infant mice in the studies had had 
massive doses of PCB’s injected directly into their peritoneums or 
stomachs. Joiner was an adult human being whose alleged 
exposure to PCB’s was far less than the exposure in the animal 
studies. The PCB’s were injected into the mice in a highly 
concentrated form. The fluid with which Joiner had come into 
contact generally had a much smaller PCB concentration . . . . The 
cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic adenomas; 
Joiner had developed small-cell carcinomas. No study 
demonstrated that adult mice developed cancer after being 
exposed to PCB’s.57 
 In effect, the trial judge ruled that the empirical studies cited by the 
plaintiff did not “fit” the opinion proffered by the plaintiff’s expert. 
There were so many dissimilarities—human being versus mouse, adult 
versus infant, dermal exposure versus injection, modest exposure versus 
massive doses, and different cancers—that the studies did not adequately 
support the expert’s opinion that the PCB exposure had caused the 
plaintiff’s cancer.58 
In affirming the trial judge’s decision, the Supreme Court held that 
under Daubert the trial judge had the right to inquire whether the 
conditions obtained in the studies were sufficiently analogous to the 
conditions in Joiner’s case.59 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the judge 
had the power to inquire whether the expert had engaged in 
unwarranted extrapolation.60 Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated that the 
judge may test the connection between “the data” cited by the expert 
 
 55. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Litigating Credibility: Expert Witness, Nat’l L.J., July 2, 2001, at 
A12. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial 
Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to 
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (2000). 
 56. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997). 
 57. Id. at 144. 
 58. Id. at 144–45. 
 59. Id. at 146. 
 60. Id. 
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and the opinion proffered by the expert.61 If the judge concludes that 
“there is simply too great an analytical gap,” the judge should exclude 
the opinion.62 
Procedurally, Chief Justice Rehnquist expanded on what was meant 
by the “flexible” inquiry mentioned in Daubert. The Chief Justice 
emphasized that the trial judge enjoys discretion in evaluating the 
reliability of the proffered evidence and in weighing the factors like error 
rate that were mentioned in Daubert.63 The Supreme Court did not affirm 
the trial judge’s ruling on the ground that the evidence proffered by the 
plaintiff was inadmissible as a matter of law. Rather, the Court held only 
that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in concluding that the 
empirical studies cited by the plaintiff lent inadequate support to the 
expert’s opinion.64 The Court held that on the facts, notably the 
numerous dissimilarities, it was “within the District Court’s discretion to 
conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied were not 
sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to support their 
conclusions that Joiner’s exposure to PCB’s contributed to his cancer.”65 
The Court stated clearly both that the trial judge’s determination was 
discretionary in character and that the appropriate scope of appellate 
review was abuse of discretion.66 
C. KUMHO TIRE 
As it became increasingly clear that the federal courts were applying 
“exacting standards of reliability”67 to determine the admissibility of 
purportedly scientific testimony under Daubert, the proponents of 
admissibility attempted to circumvent Daubert. As previously stated, the 
Daubert Court derived the validation/reliability standard from the 
wording of Rule 702. While 702 mentions “scientific . . . knowledge,” it 
also refers to “technical, or other specialized knowledge.”68 The 
proponents of admissible expert testimony argued that the standards 
enunciated in Daubert and Joiner applied only to scientific expertise and 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 141–43. 
 64. Id. at 141–43, 146–47. 
 65. Id. at 146–47. 
 66. Id. at 141–43, 146–47. But see David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence 
Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 Hastings L.J. 969, 979 (1997) (arguing that the appellate courts are 
uniquely situated to determine and balance the policy implications raised by the science, to ensure 
consistency across jurisdictions, and to evaluate the methods, principles and reasoning of multiple 
research studies); Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts 
Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 987, 1023 (2003) (arguing that appellate 
courts should apply a de novo standard when reviewing rulings admitting or excluding evidence 
presented as science). 
 67. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). 
 68. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (1975). 
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that non-scientific technical or specialized expertise was exempt from the 
Daubert test. After all, in footnote 8 of the Daubert opinion, Justice 
Blackmun had remarked: “Rule 702 also applies to ‘technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.’ Our discussion is limited to the scientific context 
because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.”69 The footnote 
made it more credible to argue that a proponent could escape the rigors 
of Daubert by the simple expedient of labeling the proffered expert 
testimony “technical” or “specialized.” 
The Court grappled with this argument in 1999 in Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael.70 Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer rejected any 
proposed distinction between scientific and non-scientific expertise. First, 
Justice Breyer rejected the distinction as a matter of statutory 
construction. He pointed out that although Rule 702 used three distinct 
terms, “scientific, technical, or . . . specialized,” all three adjectives 
modified the same noun, “knowledge.”71 Reprising Daubert, he stated 
that the term “knowledge” is the source of the “standard of evidentiary 
reliability.”72 Secondly, he questioned the logical validity of the proposed 
distinction: 
[I]t would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to 
administer evidentiary rules under which a gatekeeping 
obligation depended upon a distinction between “scientific” 
knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized” knowledge. 
There is no clear line that divides the one from the others. 
Disciplines such as engineering rest upon scientific knowledge. 
Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its development 
upon observation and properly engineered machinery. And 
conceptual efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce 
clear legal lines capable of application in particular cases.73 
However, Justice Breyer then bowed to common sense. It was 
evident that many of the factors listed in Daubert, such as peer review 
and publication, were derived from a classical scientific model. Although 
the majority agreed that Rule 702 mandates a showing of reliability 
across the board for any type of claimed expertise, Justice Breyer 
realized that it can be difficult to fit a square peg in a round hole.74 Justice 
Breyer therefore emphasized the language of Daubert to state that the 
reliability inquiry is “a flexible one.”75 Justice Breyer acknowledged that 
some of the factors listed in Daubert may not apply when the witness’ 
 
 69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8 (1993) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702). 
 70. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 71. Id. at 147. 
 72. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). 
 73. Id. at 148. 
 74. It is often asserted that it is impossible to do so. Of course, that assertion is an overstatement. 
A very small square peg can easily fit into a very large round hole. 
 75. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,150 (1999) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594). 
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expertise is non-scientific in character.76 For instance, a witness will be 
hard pressed to determine the error rate for expert theories about 
“criminal modus operandi . . . [or] agricultural practices.”77 As a result, 
Justice Breyer explained that “the trial judge must have considerable 
leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining 
whether particular expert testimony is reliable.”78  
While Joiner grants the trial judge discretion in applying the factors 
listed in Daubert, Kumho Tire confers on judges evaluating non-scientific 
expertise a different, deeper type of discretion to select factors that can 
serve as “reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”79 
This discretion, however, is not without limits. As Justice Scalia wrote in 
his concurring opinion in Kumho Tire, although “the Daubert factors are 
not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of 
them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.”80 
II.  The SARGON Opinion 
In light of Part I, we can now consider Sargon. This Part highlights 
both the similarities to and the differences from the analytical framework 
developed in the Daubert line of authority. 
A. The Prior History of the SARGON Litigation 
The plaintiff, Sargon Enterprises, Inc., is a dental implant 
manufacturer.81 Most implants on the market must be made in several 
stages. For example, the implant offered by the largest manufacturer 
requires three steps, spanning weeks.82 However, Sargon patented a 
dental implant procedure that allowed the implant to be completed in a 
single day.83 To prepare for a publicity campaign for its new procedure, 
Sargon entered into a contract with the University of Southern California 
(“USC”) School of Dentistry in 1996.84 USC agreed to conduct a clinical 
study of Sargon’s implant procedure. If the results of the study were 
positive, then Sargon could use the study in its publicity campaign; in 
addition, all the USC dental graduates from this time period would be 
familiar with the procedure and more likely to use it in practice.85 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 152. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 81. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Cal. 2012). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1243. 
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Unfortunately, Sargon’s hopes were not realized. Sargon claimed that 
USC “sabotaged”86 the study by, inter alia, failing to produce the periodic 
reports of the study’s progress as USC had promised. Sargon sued USC for 
breach of contract in 1999.87 The litigation then became a tale of two 
hearings and two appeals. 
1.  The First Hearing and Appeal 
Before the first hearing in the case, USC filed motion in limine to 
exclude Sargon’s expert testimony about lost profits on the ground that 
USC could not have foreseen them.88 As the basis for its motion, USC 
invoked the well-settled principle of contract law that an innocent plaintiff 
may recover only types of damages that the defendant should have 
foreseen at time of contract formation.89 Relying on that principle, the 
trial judge granted the motion.90 The case then proceeded to trial. At the 
2003 trial, the jury found that USC had breached its contract with Sargon 
and awarded Sargon over $400,000 in compensatory damages.91 However, 
the award did not include any recovery for lost profits; pursuant to the in 
limine ruling, the trial judge forbade Sargon from submitting any 
testimony about such profits. 
Sargon appealed from the judgment on the ground that the trial 
judge had misapplied the foreseeability principle; Sargon contended that 
although there may have been some uncertainty about the amount of lost 
profits, it was foreseeable that Sargon would lose profits if USC breached 
the contract.92 The Court of Appeal agreed with Sargon and reversed.93 
However, the court stated that given that “the in limine hearings focused 
on foreseeability and not the amount of lost profit damages, it is 
premature to determine whether such damages can be calculated with 
reasonable certainty.”94 That statement shifted the battleground from the 
foreseeability principle to another contract principle—namely, the rule 
that to be recoverable, damages must be reasonably certain.95 Although 
some jurisdictions now restrict the certainty requirement to the fact of 
damage, California still applies the requirement to both the fact and the 
amount of damage.96 
 
 86. Id. at 1249. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  
 89. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.14 (3d ed. 1999) (citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854)). 
 90. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1249. 
 91. Id. at 1240. 
 92. Id. at 1240. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Farnsworth, supra note 89, § 12.15. 
 96. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1253–54. 
Faigman_64-HLJ-1665 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:32 PM 
1678 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1665 
2.  The Second Hearing and Appeal 
On remand after the initial appeal, the trial judge conducted an 
eight-day evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the plaintiff’s 
lost profits damages were sufficiently certain to be recoverable.97 The 
primary witness at the hearing was the plaintiff’s expert James Skorheim.98 
Skorheim testified that he was a certified public accountant as well as an 
attorney; he had served as a business consultant and forensic accountant 
for twenty-five years.99 
Skorheim testified that he had intensively researched the dental 
implant industry.100 His research indicated that although worldwide there 
were ninety-six companies marketing dental implants, “the Big Six” 
controlled over eighty percent of global sales.101 Sargon was part of the 
industry, but its sales accounted for only one half of one percent of the 
world market.102 In 1998, the year before filing suit, Sargon’s net profits 
had been $101,000.103 
After surveying the industry, Skorheim developed his “market 
drivers” hypothesis.104 According to his theory, three factors largely 
determine a company’s share of the dental implant market: (1) the 
innovativeness of its products; (2) clinical studies validating the 
effectiveness of its products; and (3) outreach to general practitioners.105 
However, he acknowledged that almost all the dental implant companies 
both sponsor clinical studies and engage in outreach to general practitioner 
dentists.106 Thus, by process of elimination, the innovativeness of a 
company’s products emerged as the key determinant of its market share.107 
Skorheim conceded that he was not a dentist and, for that matter, 
could not specify criteria that a jury could use to determine the degree of 
innovativeness of a company’s products.108 He admitted that “the jury 
would have to ‘wrestle’ with” that question.109 However, he believed that 
the jury could resolve the issue because during his research he had heard 
people state that an immediate load implant like the procedure Sargon 
had patented was “the holy grail of dental implantology.”110 
 
 97. Id. at 1241. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1242. “The Big Six” were Nobel Biocare, Straumann, Biomet 3i, Zimmer, Dentsply, and 
Astra Tech. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1243. 
 103. Id. at 1242. 
 104. Id. at 1241. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1242, 1246. 
 108. Id. at 1244. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 1241. 
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Based on a comparison between Sargon and the Big Six, Skorheim 
opined that between 1998 and 2009, with the benefit of a timely, 
favorable clinical study, the innovative dental implant procedure would 
have enabled Sargon to become one of the world leaders in the 
industry.111 Because he admittedly lacked the expertise to determine how 
innovative Sargon’s procedure was, he proposed submitting four 
different scenarios to the jury.112 If the jury found that Sargon’s 
innovation was “meaningful,” during that period Sargon would have 
gained a 3.75% market share and realized approximately a quarter of a 
billion dollars in profits; if the jury decided that the innovation was 
“somewhat greater,” the market share would rise to 5% and the profits 
to a third of a billion dollars; if it was “somewhat greater yet,” the market 
share would be 10% and the profits would be in excess of $600,000,000; 
and if the innovation was “revolutionary,” the market share would 
increase to 20% and the profits would grow to approximately $1.2 billion 
dollars.113 
Skorheim acknowledged that his estimates posited a number of 
assumptions. For instance, he assumed that during the 1998–2009 period, 
one of the Big Six would fall out of that group.114 Further, he did not 
account for the possibility that Sargon’s competitors would respond by 
developing even more innovative products.115 He appeared to assume that 
“the Big Six would have taken no steps to contend with their new 
competitor, Sargon.”116 Moreover, although in 2007 Sargon was only “a 
three-person operation”117 without a marketing or research and 
development department,118 he assumed that Sargon would marshal the 
financial resources and managerial skill to overcome those handicaps and 
rival the Big Six. 
Based on this record, the trial judge excluded Skorheim’s testimony.119 
The judge found several flaws in the foundation for Skorheim’s opinions. 
To begin with, the judge concluded that Skorheim’s lost profit estimates 
were based on an invalid comparison between Sargon and the Big Six 
market leaders; Sargon was too dissimilar.120 By “objective business 
measure[s]” such as the number of employees, Sargon and the Big Six 
were “worlds apart.”121 By way of example, in the 2001–2003 period 
 
 111. Id. at 1244. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1244. 
 114. Id. at 1257. 
 115. Id. at 1248. 
 116. Id. at 1257. 
 117. Id. at 1248. 
 118. Id. at 1242, 1257. 
 119. Id. at 1246. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1245–46. 
Faigman_64-HLJ-1665 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:32 PM 
1680 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1665 
Nobel Biocare had eighty field representatives in the United States 
alone.122 Further, the submission of Skorheim’s opinions to the jury 
would require the jury to determine the degree of innovativeness of 
Sargon’s products; because Skorheim admitted that he could not 
articulate any criteria of innovativeness, the jury would have no 
“standards from which it [could] make a rational decision.”123 In addition, 
the judge faulted Skorheim’s reliance on speculative assumptions such as 
the failure of the Big Six to retain their market shares by aggressively 
responding to Sargon’s competition.124 
Just as Sargon had appealed the trial judge’s initial ruling on the 
contract issue, Sargon appealed the judge’s order excluding Skorheim’s 
testimony on evidentiary grounds.125 Once again, Sargon prevailed. Just 
as the Court of Appeal had rebuffed the trial judge’s analysis of the 
foreseeability issue, in the second appeal the court rejected the judge’s 
imposition of the limitations on Skorheim’s expert testimony by a two-to-
one vote.126 Although the court noted that there was merit in many of the 
judge’s criticisms of Skorheim’s testimony, the court held that under 
California evidence law those issues “were better left for the jury’s 
assessment.”127 Under the court’s construction of California evidence law, 
the weaknesses in Skorheim’s testimony cut to its weight, not its 
admissibility. 
B. The California Supreme Court’s Opinion in SARGON 
While Sargon appealed the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling to the 
Court of Appeal, USC prosecuted an appeal of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision to the California Supreme Court. On November 26, 2012, the 
California Supreme Court rendered a unanimous opinion, with Justice 
Chin writing for the court. 
On appeal, Sargon challenged USC to identify any statutory basis for 
excluding Skorheim’s testimony. At the outset of his analysis, Justice Chin 
addressed that challenge. Sargon argued that Skorheim’s testimony 
satisfied California Evidence Code section 801. In pertinent part, section 
801(b) allows an expert to base an opinion on matter “that is of a type that 
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon 
the subject.”128 Sargon contended that Skorheim had established that 
forensic valuation experts such as himself routinely rely on the sort of 
market studies that he had conducted in the instant case. 
 
 122. Id. at 1248. 
 123. Id. at 1246. 
 124. Id. at 1248 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 125. Id. at 1249. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Cal. Evid. Code § 80i (2012). 
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While acknowledging Sargon’s argument, Justice Chin responded 
that “Evidence Code section 801 is not the only statute that governs the 
trial court’s gatekeeping role.”129 Citing a recent Loyola Law Review 
article on point (the “Loyola article”),130 written by the present Authors, 
the Justice stated that Evidence Code section 802 applies. In pertinent 
part, section 802 provides: “A witness testifying in the form of an opinion 
may state on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the 
matter . . . upon which it is based, unless he is precluded by law from 
using such reasons or matter as a basis for his opinion.”131 
Justice Chin immediately pointed out that section 160 of the Evidence 
Code contains a definition of “law.”132 According to that section, the term 
“law” in the California Evidence Code includes “decisional law.”133 Hence, 
construed in light of section 160, section 802 authorizes the California 
judiciary to enforce uncodified limitations on the “reasons” underlying a 
proffered expert opinion.134 
The question then became whether the trial judge had properly 
exercised that authority in excluding Skorheim’s testimony. Justice Chin 
stated that in California, the normal scope of appellate review of trial 
court evidentiary decisions is an abuse of discretion.135 Writing for the 
court, Justice Chin held that the trial judge’s ruling was not an abuse of 
discretion.136 He agreed with each of the trial judge’s fundamental 
criticisms of the foundation for Skorheim’s opinions. 
Quoting the Loyola article, the court ruled that under section 802, 
the judge may at the very least conduct “a ‘circumscribed inquiry’ to 
‘determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other 
information cited by experts adequately support the conclusion that the 
expert’s general theory or technique is valid.’”137 In the court’s view, 
Skorheim’s testimony did not adequately support his proffered opinions 
because, as the trial judge had found, Sargon was not substantially 
similar to the Big Six that Skorheim had used for purposes of 
comparison.138 The court approvingly quoted the trial judge’s finding that 
Sargon was not similar to the industry leaders by “any relevant, objective 
business measure.”139 The court underscored Skorheim’s admission that 
 
 129. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1251. 
 130. Id. at 1251–52. 
 131. Cal. Evid. Code § 802. 
 132. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252. 
 133. Cal. Evid. Code § 160. 
 134. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1256. 
 137. Id. at 1252 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence Code Section 802: The 
Neglected Key to Rationalizing the Law of Expert Testimony, 42 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 427, 449 (2009)). 
 138. Id. at 1256. 
 139. Id. 
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Sargon was distinguishable from the Big Six by “objective business 
metric[s], such as sales or number of employees.”140 
Likewise, the court concurred with the trial judge’s conclusion that 
Skorheim’s inability to articulate guidelines for a jury determination of a 
degree of innovativeness was fatal to the admissibility of Skorheim’s 
opinions.141 Without the benefit of any criteria or guidelines, the jury’s 
determination of “the degree of innovativeness” would lack a “rational 
basis.”142 
Finally, the court agreed with the trial judge that Skorheim’s 
opinions rested on several critical, conjectural assumptions. The court 
observed: 
An accountant might be able to determine with reasonable 
precision what Sargon’s profits would have been if it had 
achieved a market share comparable to one of the Big Six. The 
problem here, however, is that the expert’s testimony provided 
no logical basis to infer that Sargon would have achieved that 
market share.143 
In particular, the court pointed to Skorheim’s highly debatable 
assumptions that one of the Big Six companies would drop out of the 
market and that the members of the Big Six would not take effective 
measures to counter Sargon’s competition.144 Given the questionable 
nature of these assumptions, Justice Chin held that the trial judge had not 
erred in barring Skorheim’s opinions because they were “speculative.”145 
III.  Expert Evidence in California After SARGON 
This Article’s Introduction noted that following Daubert, states 
must consider whether they should follow the federal regime. Most states 
have adopted Daubert to one extent or another. Sargon reinvigorates the 
issue in California and places the question front and center: Is California 
now a Daubert state? 
This Part shows that the answer is not a simple yes or no. Sargon is 
highly significant for California’s expert evidence law in ways that reach 
beyond whether California can now be categorically declared a Daubert 
state. There are three separate but related ways that Sargon must be 
understood vis-a-vis Daubert. The first is that unlike previous California 
case law, Sargon alters the fundamental focus of a trial court’s 
admissibility decision. Before Sargon, California courts either deferred to 
what was generally accepted in a particular field or accepted the 
 
 140. Id. at 1255. 
 141. Id. at 1255–56. 
 142. Id. at 1247. 
 143. Id. at 1258. 
 144. Id. at 1257. 
 145. Id. at 1258. 
Faigman_64-HLJ-1665 (Do Not Delete) 9/25/2013 12:32 PM 
August 2013]       WADING INTO THE DAUBERT TIDE 1683 
professional practice of the testifying witness. After Sargon, trial judges 
have been appointed gatekeepers charged with scrutinizing the reliability 
of all expert evidence.  
Subpart A explains that on this issue Sargon generally aligns with 
Daubert. Subpart B explores an issue left ambiguous in Sargon: How the 
decision will impact the California courts’ longstanding differential 
treatment of technologically-based scientific evidence and non-technical 
or experience-based expert evidence. Although Sargon seems to apply to 
all expert testimony, the court did not explicitly abandon the old Kelly-
Frye approach as applied to scientific evidence. Quite to the contrary, 
Sargon indicates that the Kelly-Frye test survives. The question, 
discussed in Subpart B, is how the courts should apply Sargon in 
conjunction with California’s Kelly-Frye standard. While Subparts A and 
B deal with the substantive scope and operation of Sargon, Subpart C 
turns to the question of whether Sargon mandates the same procedural 
regime prescribed by Daubert. Subpart C answers that question in the 
negative. Thus, on this issue Sargon generally does not align with 
Daubert. The upshot of the analysis in Subparts A through C is that while 
there is much of Daubert in Sargon, and Sargon is likely to transform 
California practice, it is an oversimplification to say that California is 
now a Daubert state. 
A. SARGON’s DAUBERT Perspective 
To the extent that Daubert was revolutionary, it was so because the 
decision fundamentally altered the way that trial courts perceived and 
evaluated expert evidence.146 Daubert focused courts on the methods and 
principles that underlie expert testimony and thus required judges and 
lawyers to understand the basis for the knowledge being claimed in 
court. In comparison, under the Frye test courts merely ask whether the 
basis for the expert opinion was generally accepted among those most 
likely to know. Daubert refocused courts’ attention on the bases 
themselves. Sargon no longer permits trial judges to defer to some proxy 
professional group, but rather assigns them the weighty responsibility of 
inquiring how the knowledge was derived. In epistemological terms, what 
is the group’s knowledge claim, and is there an adequate warrant for the 
claim? 
Although this question of analytical perspective may appear 
theoretical, it has myriad practical implications. Before Daubert, many 
experts testified on the basis of little more than conjecture and 
supposition. Many of the forensic identification sciences—including fields 
such as bitemarks, arson, and handwriting—are based principally on 
consensus in the field rather than empirical data validating their expert 
 
 146. See generally Faigman, supra note 27. 
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methodologies. This difference is even more dramatic in the areas of 
medicine, psychology, and psychiatry. In these areas, California has 
traditionally applied the “opinion rule” to admit expert opinion with 
virtually no scrutiny if the opinion was based on the experience of an 
otherwise qualified expert.147 Daubert calls on courts not to defer to 
guild-like consensus, but instead to independently inquire into the 
soundness and adequacy of the bases of claimed expert knowledge. 
While California courts previously employed standards of deference to 
professional fields—under either Frye’s general acceptance precept or 
the opinion rule—Sargon endorses the independent perspective 
embraced by the Daubert trilogy. 
Daubert assigns federal trial judges a gatekeeping responsibility to 
screen out unreliable testimony. In short, the California Supreme Court 
borrowed key terminology from the Daubert lexicon in Sargon. At several 
points in his opinion, for example, Justice Chin uses the expression 
“gatekeeping” to describe the role of a California judge passing on the 
admissibility of expert testimony.148 Further, Justice Chin repeatedly 
makes it clear that the purpose of that assignment is to task the trial judge 
to exclude “unreliable” expert testimony.149  
Significantly, when the Sargon court defined the determination that 
the California judge must make as a gatekeeper, the court used language 
strikingly similar to the corresponding passage in Daubert. In his opinion, 
Justice Blackmun wrote that the federal trial judge must decide whether 
the expert’s opinion is “supported by appropriate validation.”150 In the 
equivalent portion of his opinion, Justice Chin stated that the California 
trial judge must “determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and 
other information cited by experts adequately support the” expert’s 
conclusion.151 
The Sargon court borrowed insights from Kumho Tire as well. 
Part I.C explains that the most important teaching of Kumho Tire is that 
the reliability requirement arising from Rule 702’s reference to 
“knowledge” applies to every type of claimed expertise, whether it is 
scientific, technical, or specialized. It is true that in footnote six of his 
opinion Justice Chin mentions the general acceptance test and seems to 
reserve it for gauging the admissibility of “new scientific techniques.”152 
However, throughout his opinion, Justice Chin makes no distinction 
 
 147. David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” and Other Oddities and 
Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, The Scientific Revolution, and Common Sense, 36 Sw. U. L. Rev. 
699, 706–07 (2008). 
 148. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1249–52, 1258. 
 149. Id. at 1250, 1252. 
 150. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 
 151. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252.  
 152. Id. at 1252 n.6. 
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between the various types of expertise. Rather, the analysis outlined in 
the opinion appears to apply to any offer of expert testimony in a 
California court. In this respect, Sargon reaches the same result as the 
outcome in Kumho Tire. 
While Sargon contains passages duplicating the analytics of Daubert 
and Kumho Tire, probably the most striking parallel is between Sargon 
and Joiner. Part I.B of the opinion noted that the essence of the Joiner 
Court’s teaching was that the trial judge had discretion to evaluate the 
aptness of the analogy between the conditions in the studies cited by 
plaintiff’s experts and the facts in Joiner’s case history. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that the trial judge justifiably found that the 
conditions in the “studies were so dissimilar to the facts presented in [the 
Joiner] litigation that it was not an abuse of discretion for the District 
Court to have rejected the experts’ reliance on them.”153 The Sargon trial 
judge relied on an identical mode of reasoning, and like the United 
States Supreme Court in Joiner, the California Supreme Court sustained 
the trial judge’s reasoning. Just as the Joiner Court listed the differences 
between adult humans and infant mice, injection and dermal exposure, 
and adenoma and small-cell carcinoma, Justice Chin enumerated several 
“objective business measures,”154 such as the number of employees155 and 
sales representatives,156 that the trial judge had identified as 
distinguishing Sargon from the Big Six. Echoing Joiner, Justice Chin 
found that the trial judge had not abused discretion in concluding that 
“Sargon was dissimilar to all of the Big Six.”157 In both cases, the trial 
judges second-guessed an analogy underlying the expert’s opinion. And 
in both instances, the court of last resort found that the trial judge had 
exercised permissible, sensible discretion in rejecting the analogy urged 
by the expert. 
Notwithstanding the clear parallels between Sargon and the Daubert 
trilogy, it may prove to be a mistake to predict that the California courts 
will wholeheartedly embrace the rigorous federal approach to assessing 
the admissibility of expert testimony. To begin, Justice Chin’s opinion is 
measured, containing abundant language that is consistent with the 
California courts’ previously liberal approach to the admissibility of 
opinion testimony that is based on non-instrumental expert theories and 
techniques.158 Sargon evinces sympathy with the policy considerations 
that inspired that liberality. At the beginning of part II.A (devoted to the 
evidentiary analysis), Justice Chin quoted Judge Friendly to the effect 
 
 153. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997). 
 154. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1256.  
 155. Id. at 1243, 1246.  
 156. Id. at 1255. 
 157. Id. at 1256. 
 158. Barnes, supra note 7, at 11. 
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that in light of “the guaranty of the Seventh Amendment,” a trial judge 
“must be exceedingly careful not to set the threshold to the jury room 
too high.”159 Paraphrasing Judge Friendly, Justice Chin stated that “due 
to the jury trial right, courts should not set the admission bar too high.”160 
Later in the same part, Justice Chin asserts that trial judges “must . . . be 
cautious in excluding expert testimony. . . . [T]he trial court’s task is not 
to choose the most reliable of the offered opinions and exclude the 
others.”161 Part II.B of his opinion analyzed the interplay between the 
contract principle of certainty and the expert opinion rules. Justice Chin 
wrote: 
Once again, we add a cautionary note. The lost profit inquiry is always 
speculative to some degree. Inevitably, there will be an element of 
uncertainty. Courts must not be too quick to exclude expert evidence 
as speculative merely because the expert cannot say with absolute 
certainty what the profits would have been. Courts must not eviscerate 
the possibility of recovering lost profits by too broadly defining what is 
too speculative.162 
Furthermore, in future cases the proponents of expert testimony will 
have a plausible argument for distinguishing Sargon on its facts. In the 
court’s perspective, Skorheim’s testimony about lost profits was highly 
speculative. The facts in the record below were extraordinary. Although 
determining the degree of innovativeness was obviously the key to 
choosing among Skorheim’s four scenarios, Skorheim admitted frankly 
that he could not provide the jury with any criteria or guidelines for 
making the choice.163 He conceded bluntly that the lay jurors “would have 
to ‘wrestle’” with the choice.164 In his fourth, revolutionary scenario, 
Sargon’s profits would have skyrocketed by 157,000%165—“wildly 
beyond . . . anything Sargon had ever experienced in the past.”166 Skorheim 
predicted that Sargon would not have merely modest or substantial but 
rather “spectacular” future success.167 The facts and claims in Sargon were 
so extreme that in a later, more mundane case, the proponent of an expert 
opinion will have a plausible argument for distinguishing Sargon. And, as 
we have seen, the proponent can strengthen that argument by citing 
Justice Chin’s statements to the effect that the Seventh Amendment jury 
 
 159. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1250 (quoting Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 
F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1252. 
 162. Id. at 1254. 
 163. Id. at 1246. 
 164. Id. at 1244. 
 165. Id. at 1245. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1255. 
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trial guarantee counsels that trial judges should think long and hard 
before denying a jury relevant expert testimony.168 
Given Justice Chin’s discussion of the jury trial guarantee and the 
extreme facts in Sargon, it is an unjustified leap to conclude that Sargon 
requires California trial judges to police the quality of expert testimony 
in the same manner and to the same extent as the federal courts currently 
do. Despite those caveats, it is clear that there is an important common 
denominator between Sargon and Daubert. By announcing the federal 
trial judge’s “gatekeeping” role, Daubert fundamentally altered the 
perspective from which trial judges evaluate expert evidence. Sargon has 
done the same for California by stressing the state trial judge’s 
“gatekeeping” responsibility. Whatever other differences may persist 
between the federal and California approaches to determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony, at the very least trial judges must engage 
in a Joiner-style analysis under both approaches and, as gatekeepers, 
critically inquire whether the proponent’s foundational testimony has 
sufficient probative value to support the expert’s knowledge claim.169 
B. Reconciling SARGON’s DAUBERT Perspective with KELLY-FRYE 
Until Sargon, it was fair to say that while the federal courts enforced 
Daubert, California remained committed to the Frye general acceptance 
standard. Subpart A demonstrated that Sargon moved toward Daubert in 
requiring California trial judges to adopt a critical “gatekeeping” 
perspective. However, the Sargon court briefly alluded to the Kelly-Frye 
general acceptance test in a footnote. Footnote six reads in its entirety: 
In People v. Leahy, this court held that the “general acceptance” test 
for admissibility of expert testimony based on new scientific techniques 
still applies in California courts despite the United States Supreme 
Court’s rejection in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. of a 
similar test in federal courts. Nothing we say in this case affects our 
holding in Leahy regarding new scientific techniques.170 
Thus, it appears that Kelly-Frye is still good law in California. How will 
California’s traditional Kelly-Frye test operate in conjunction with 
Sargon? There are two thoughts to bear in mind. 
First, the differences between the general acceptance and validation 
tests should not be overstated. Daubert’s assignment of a gatekeeping 
role to trial judges does not make Daubert a more rigorous test than its 
predecessor Frye. Daubert has been extolled and excoriated for being 
 
 168. It’s worth noting, however, that Justice Blackmun in Daubert similarly stated, as Justice Chin 
emphasized, the “liberal thrust” underlying evidentiary rules. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). This issue is discussed further in Part II.B. 
 169. People v. Dry Canyon Enters., 211 Cal. App. 4th 486, 493 (2012) (citing Sargon, 288 P.3d at 
1237)) (“Trial judges have a substantial gatekeeping responsibility when it comes to expert testimony.”).  
 170. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 n.6 (internal citations omitted). 
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both too rigorous and too permissive toward proffered expert testimony. 
But the validation test itself is not inherently more or less demanding 
than Frye. The focus of the validation test is simply different, which can 
lead to very different results. While Frye defers to a respective field’s 
view of the bases for its members’ expertise, Daubert tasks judges to 
independently assess the claimed bases for an expert’s ostensible 
expertise. Frye, therefore, should be expected to be more liberal than 
Daubert when applied to fields with considerable consensus of opinion, 
but which lack a robust methodological foundation. Conversely, Daubert 
can be expected to be more liberal than Frye when applied to fields that 
are highly contentious, but which possess considerable methodological 
underpinnings. 
Moreover, Daubert contains considerable language extolling the 
“liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The opinion begins by 
describing the liberality of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the need 
for fact-finders to hear all relevant evidence,171 and proceeds to observe 
that the “basic standard of relevance” in the Federal Rules “is a liberal 
one.”172 The Court also noted the Rules’ “permissive backdrop” and the 
“austere standard” inherent in the traditional Frye approach.173 
Significantly, the Court stated that the “rigid ‘general acceptance’ 
requirement would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal 
Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 
‘opinion’ testimony.’”174 
When Daubert was decided, the principal issue presented was the 
continuing viability of the Frye test under federal law. The Daubert 
Court held that the Federal Rules did not incorporate Frye, and the 
Court consequently construed Rule 702 as supplanting Frye. However, in 
discussing how courts should implement the validity approach mandated 
by the Federal Rules, the Daubert Court observed that “‘general 
acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.”175 Although general 
acceptance was no longer the litmus test, it remained pertinent. To be 
specific, general acceptance can furnish relevant circumstantial evidence 
of the methodological soundness of the reasoning and data underlying an 
expert’s technique; if a technique has been in circulation long enough to 
have garnered general acceptance, other experts have presumably had 
time to study the technique’s bases and have come away satisfied. 
General acceptance, the centerpiece of Frye, became one of the four 
factors the Court identified (along with testability, error rate, and peer 
review and publication) as useful for determining whether the proffered 
 
 171. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 589. 
 174. Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)). 
 175. Id. at 594. 
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expert opinion is adequately supported by valid methods and 
principles.176 Indeed, many federal trial judges have ascribed considerable 
weight to this factor in conducting their Daubert calculus.177 Thus, general 
acceptance plays a significant role under both Daubert and Frye. 
Secondly, Sargon and Kelly-Frye can plausibly coexist in California.178 
While in Sargon the court offered no clear guidance regarding how the 
more Daubert-like perspective it embraced is to be reconciled with past 
practice, the key to understanding footnote six may come from the 
paragraph it follows, in which the court summarizes its holding. The court 
explains that: 
[U]nder Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802, 
the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion 
testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an 
expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons 
unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) 
speculative. Other provisions of law, including decisional law, 
may also provide reasons for excluding expert opinion 
testimony.179 
According to the court, Evidence Code sections 801 and 802 mandate a 
gatekeeping role for trial courts that applies to all expert testimony. 
These code sections require trial judges to enforce a minimum threshold 
for expert evidence. The California trial judge must inspect the premises 
of any proffered expert opinions to ensure that they fall above the 
threshold. 
However, the Sargon opinion suggests that in certain cases, the 
threshold might be higher. When, as the California Supreme court stated 
in People v. McDonald, the expert evidence is “produced by a machine,”180 
the proffered testimony may have to pass muster under Kelly-Frye as well 
as section 801. Once the Sargon court construed section 802 as 
empowering it to enforce uncodified limitations on expert testimony, 
Sargon legitimated continued judicial enforcement of the general 
acceptance test. The California courts might still reason that instrumental 
scientific evidence presents such a substantial risk of overawing lay jurors 
that certain types of expert testimony ought to be singled out and 
required to run the gauntlet of both Kelly-Frye and sections 801 and 802. 
It remains to be seen whether the California courts will reconcile 
Sargon and Kelly-Frye in this fashion. To an extent, this reconciliation 
would require California judges to differentiate between truly “scientific” 
 
 176. Id. at 593–95. 
 177. See generally Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert 
Evidence in Federal Civil Actions Since the Daubert Decision, 8 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 251 (2002). 
 178. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Frye’s General Acceptance Test vs. 
Daubert’s Validation Standard—“Either . . . Or” or “Both . . . And”?, 33 Crim. L. Bull. 72 (1997). 
 179. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1252 (Cal. 2012). 
 180. 690 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal. 1984). 
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testimony and non-scientific expertise—the type of line drawing that the 
Kumho Tire Court eschewed. In Kumho Tire, Justice Breyer asserted that 
“it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer 
evidentiary rules under which . . . [the admissibility standard] depended 
upon a distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or 
‘other specialized’ knowledge.”181 There is certainly merit in Justice 
Breyer’s assertion. However, the California courts could solve that 
problem by restricting the more demanding standard to purportedly 
scientific testimony involving instrumentation; the incorporation of that 
element into the scope limitation might render the scope limitation more 
judicially manageable. In effect, this is what courts did prior to Sargon, 
and despite Justice Breyer’s epistemological point to the contrary, 
California courts might continue to do so after Sargon. Certainly, logic 
does not dictate that the general acceptance and validation tests are 
mutually exclusive.182 After Sargon, the two tests may exist side by side in 
California courts, and the courts may rule that scientific expert testimony 
based on instrumental analysis must satisfy both tests. 
C. A Comparison of the Procedures for Applying DAUBERT and 
SARGON 
Under both the Daubert trilogy and Sargon, the trial judge must 
employ a critical, “gatekeeping” perspective. The question is whether 
Sargon authorizes a California judge to probe as deeply as Daubert 
mandates. Subpart A demonstrates that Sargon suggests that the 
California Supreme Court sympathizes with the federal approach to expert 
opinion testimony. A close reading of the Sargon opinion, however, 
indicates that the Sargon court stopped short of fully embracing the 
procedural demands set forth in Daubert. As Part I.A emphasizes, in his 
opinion Justice Blackmun explicitly stated that the preliminary fact-
finding approach codified in Federal Rule 104(a) governs the trial judge’s 
reliability determination under Daubert. Part I.A explains that when 
104(a) governs, the trial judge acts as a trier of fact; the trial judge must 
consider the foundational testimony on both sides and can weigh the 
credibility of the testimony in choosing which testimony to believe.183 In 
federal practice, the trial judge decides by a preponderance of the 
evidence, after weighing the foundational testimony on both sides, 
whether there is adequate, methodologically sound empirical data and 
 
 181. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 148 (1999). 
 182. Imwinkelried, supra note 178, at 83. 
 183. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule 702 
contemplates that the judge will consider the evidence on both sides. For example, it refers to “Claar 
v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502–05 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing the trial court’s technique of 
ordering experts to submit serial affidavits explaining the reasoning and methods underlying their 
conclusions).” Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note. 
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reasoning to support the hypothesis that the expert’s theory or technique 
is valid. 
In the critical passage in Sargon, Justice Chin stopped short of 
assigning or empowering California trial judges the responsibility to make 
such a decision. Again, quoting the Loyola article, Justice Chin stated that 
a California trial judge must conduct “a circumscribed inquiry’ to 
‘determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other information 
cited by experts adequately support the conclusion that the expert’s 
general theory or technique is valid.”184 Notice two things about the 
wording of that statement. First, rather than mentioning both sides’ 
foundational testimony, the statement can be interpreted as referring only 
to “the studies and other information cited by [the proponent’s] 
experts.”185 Second, and more importantly, the statement does not require 
the trial judge to make a factual determination by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Rather, the statement directs the trial judge to make a 
“circumscribed” decision “as a matter of logic.” That language is consistent 
with the assumption that the California trial judge is to focus on the 
proponent’s foundational testimony and decide whether “as a matter of 
logic” that testimony is adequate to support the hypothesis of the validity 
of the expert’s underlying theory or technique. 
Several aspects of Sargon support this limited reading. The court 
describes Skorheim as “the primary witness” at the hearing on USC’s 
motion in limine.186 Nowhere in the opinion does the court mention any 
defense testimony contradicting Skorheim’s factual testimony about 
Sargon, the Big Six, or the global market. For that matter, there is no 
passage in the opinion in which the court rejected as incredible any of 
Skorheim’s foundational testimony. As far as the opinion indicates, both 
the trial court and the California Supreme Court accepted that testimony 
at face value and confined their analyses to the question of whether “as a 
matter of logic” that testimony provided adequate support for 
Skorheim’s ultimate opinions. In large part because of the inaptness of 
the analogy between Sargon and the Big Six, the trial judge answered 
that question in the negative, and the California Supreme Court found 
this that answer did not amount to an abuse of the trial judge’s 
discretion. 
A limited reading becomes even more plausible when one considers 
the Sargon court’s repeated references to the earlier Lockheed Litigation 
 
 184. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1252 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence 
Code Section 802: The Neglected Key to Rationalizing the Law of Expert Testimony, 42 Loy. L.A. L. 
Rev. 427, 449 (2009)). 
 185. See Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected 
Key to Rationalizing the Law of Expert Testimony, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 427, 449 (2009). 
 186. Sargon, 288 P.3d. at 1241. 
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Cases.187 Like Sargon, those consolidated cases asked whether the 
California judiciary possesses the authority to impose decisional restrictions 
on the admissibility of expert testimony and, if so, how the courts should 
exercise that authority.188 The California Supreme Court never reached 
the merits of those questions in the Lockheed Litigation Cases: 
In a stunning turn of events in 2007, the Court dismissed review after 
the case had been pending before the California Supreme Court for 
two years. The apparent explanation is that a majority of members of 
the court had stock holdings that they believed required them to recuse 
themselves from the case. The justices could have designated pro tem 
judges to fill out the panel to decide the case, but they chose not to 
exercise that option. However, the upshot is that the disposition of the 
case left this evidentiary issue unresolved.189 
Although five years passed between the dismissal of the Lockheed 
Litigation Cases and Sargon, Justice Chin’s opinion made it clear that the 
court had not forgotten either the cases or the questions that they posed. 
Indeed, early in part II.A of his opinion, Justice Chin wrote: 
In Lockheed Litigation Cases, the plaintiffs argued that under Evidence 
Code section 801, subdivision (b), “a court should determine only 
whether the type of matter that an expert relies on in forming his or her 
opinion is the type of matter that an expert reasonably can rely on in 
forming an opinion, without regard to whether the matter relied on 
reasonably does support the particular opinion offered.”190 
It was that very plaintiffs’ argument that had prompted the authors of the 
Loyola article (quoted by Justice Chin) to submit an amicus brief in the 
Lockheed Litigation Cases to challenge the plaintiffs’ argument.191 When 
the court dismissed the Lockheed Litigation Cases, the authors converted 
their amicus brief into the Loyola article that was eventually cited by the 
Sargon court.192 
In the passage from the Loyola article that Sargon approvingly 
quoted, the authors urged the California Supreme Court to adopt the view 
that under section 802, California trial judges may conduct a 
“circumscribed inquiry” to “determine whether, as a matter of logic, the 
studies and other information cited by experts adequately support the 
conclusion that the expert’s general theory or technique is valid.”193 In 
proposing that view, the authors specifically stated: 
[I]n conducting the proposed inquiry under the Evidence Code, a 
California trial judge would be playing a much narrower role than the 
role assigned to federal judges under Daubert. In Daubert, the Court 
 
 187. Id. at 1250–51 (referencing Lockheed Litig. Cases, 115 Cal. App. 4th 558 (2004)).  
 188. Imwinkelried & Faigman, supra note 186, at 428–30. 
 189. Id. at 430 (internal citations omitted). 
 190. Sargon, 288 P.3d at 1250–51 (internal citations omitted). 
 191. Imwinkelried & Faigman, supra note 185, at 429–30. 
 192. Id. at 427. 
 193. Id. at 449. 
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expressly stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) governs the 
judge’s determination as to whether the proponent has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the expert has validated his or her 
theory or technique by sound scientific methodology. When a federal 
judge determines the existence of a foundational fact under Rule 
104(a), “the judge acts as a trier of fact. . . . If the question is factual in 
nature, the judge will of necessity receive evidence pro and con on the 
issue.” When the proponent and opponent submit conflicting 
testimony about the disputed foundational fact, a federal trial judge 
can consider the credibility of the testimony and resolve the dispute on 
the basis of a credibility determination.194 
The authors did not specifically argue that California trial judges 
should be empowered to make such credibility determinations.195 Instead, 
they suggested the more modest proposal that the California Supreme 
Court assign trial judges the task of reviewing the proponent’s 
foundational testimony to decide whether, as a matter of logic, that 
testimony furnishes adequate support for the expert’s ultimate opinion.196 
They provided an example of the minimum inquiry demanded by the 
California Evidence Code. Suppose that in a pesticide case, the plaintiff 
calls an epidemiologist as an expert: 
[T]he expert testifies along the following lines: there are thirty 
published studies involving 130,000 patients; every study yielded the 
finding that the relative risk was only 1.0; the incidence of cancer in the 
exposed group was no higher than the incidence of the disease in the 
general population; the expert conducted a metanalysis of the studies; 
and that metanalysis also yielded the finding that the relative risk is no 
higher. Yet, based solely on the epidemiological [data], the expert is 
prepared to testify to the validity of the general theory that exposure to 
the pesticide causes cancer.197 
On one hand, this foundational testimony technically satisfies the 
letter of Evidence Code section 801 because these are the types of 
studies that epidemiologists customarily rely on. On the other hand, 
given the studies’ uniform finding that exposure to the pesticide does not 
increase the risk of cancer, it is illogical to treat those studies as adequate 
support for the expert’s causation opinion. If the judge can enforce only 
the letter of section 801, then the judge’s hands are tied—she must admit 
the testimony. However, even without a full commitment to Daubert, a 
California trial judge could exclude the opinion if she may conduct a 
limited inquiry whether “as a matter of logic,” the empirical data cited by 
the expert justifies the expert’s opinion. 
As in the case of the possible reconciliation of Daubert and Kelly-
Frye, discussed in Subpart B, Sargon does not furnish a clear answer to 
 
 194. Id. at 446–47 (alterations in original). 
 195. Id. at 449. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 444. 
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the present question. Although the court did not expressly accord 
California trial judges the authority to conduct the sort of full-blown 
inquiry permissible under Federal Rule 104(a), it did not forbid such an 
inquiry. The Sargon court might have contemplated that in the future 
California trial judges should be as active as federal judges in conducting 
the kind of probing Daubert reliability inquiry permissible under 
Rule 104(a). Since 1976, California has employed the Frye general 
acceptance test to determine the admissibility of testimony based on novel 
scientific theories. There is California authority198 that when the trial judge 
rules under Frye, the judge should follow the preliminary fact-finding 
procedures set out in California Evidence Code § 405—an analogue to and 
model for Federal Rule 104(a).199 Since Frye and Daubert both serve as 
admissibility standards for expert testimony, that authority suggests that to 
be consistent, California trial judges ought to follow the procedures in 
section 405 to determine the reliability of the proffered testimony under 
Sargon. 
Conclusion 
Sargon is arguably the most important California expert testimony 
decision in nearly two decades.200 While it is always difficult to forecast 
the impact of significant decisions like Sargon, it undeniably moves 
California law closer to the federal approach. How much closer remains 
to be determined. As we have seen, California courts have traditionally 
favored the liberal admissibility of expert testimony.201 Justice Chin’s 
decision reminds us that the Seventh Amendment jury trial guarantee 
shows that, to an extent, that policy has a constitutional dimension.202 
Part III begins by remarking that there is no simple yes or no answer 
to the question of whether Sargon “adopted” Daubert. In one respect, the 
two opinions are quite kindred. As we saw in Subpart A, it is undeniable 
that to some extent, Sargon requires California trial judges to assume 
“gatekeeping” responsibilities and reject any expert’s ipse dixit claim that 
his or her knowledge claim is valid. Like the federal trial judge in Joiner, a 
California trial judge may now accept arguendo a proponent’s 
foundational testimony but still rule that the testimony does not provide 
sufficient warrant for the expert’s knowledge claim. 
In two other respects, though, it is unclear how closely the new 
California approach will track the federal trilogy. First, even after Sargon 
the California approach may be more liberal than the federal approach. In 
 
 198. See generally In re Robert B., 218 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1985). 
 199. Fed. R. Evid. 104 advisory committee’s note. 
 200. Leahy, the case in which the California Supreme Court refused to adopt Daubert, was decided 
in 1994. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994). 
 201. Barnes, supra note 7, at 2. 
 202. Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237, 1250 (Cal. 2012).  
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Daubert, Justice Blackmun went to some length to explicitly state that 
Federal Rule 104(a) governs the federal trial judge’s admissibility 
analysis.203 Consequently, the federal judge can probe deeply, even passing 
on the credibility of the foundational testimony. The Sargon opinion does 
not explicitly empower California trial judges to go that far. Secondly, 
however, the California approach may prove to be more demanding—or 
at least more complicated—than the federal approach. If Kelly-Frye is 
still good law in California, proponents of scientific testimony involving 
instrumentation may face the daunting prospect of surmounting both 
hurdles to admissibility. 
For now, it is uncertain whether California lower courts will give 
Sargon a limited reading and conduct only a “circumscribed inquiry” into 
whether the proponent’s foundational testimony furnishes adequate 
support for the expert’s hypothesis. In the original Daubert decision, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressly worried about whether it was realistic 
to expect federal trial judges to act as “amateur scientists.”204 This worry 
might be greater among state court judges. In many jurisdictions, state 
trial judges have fewer clerks and more limited access to scientific 
literature than federal judges.205 Even if Daubert is the right choice for 
the federal judiciary, a state could reasonably conclude that it is not the 
right path for it to take.206 Alternatively, the California courts might well 
find that a gradual, incremental movement toward the Daubert approach 
is preferable. If so, Sargon will certainly mark the beginning of this move. 
In Sargon, the California Supreme Court demonstrated its interest in 
testing the Daubert waters. Only time will tell whether the court is ready 
to take the plunge. 
 
 203. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 598, 592–95 (1993). 
 204. Id. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 205. See generally Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges 
on Judging Expert in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & Hum. Behav. 433 (2001). 
 206. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Master Class: Evidence Equilibrium, Nat’l L.J, July 22, 2002, at B9. 
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